Mechanics of a Successful Exchange-Rate Peg: Lessons for Emerging Markets
- Dueker, Michael J. (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
- Fischer, Andreas (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis)
- Archival Version (Subtitle)
AbstractTo the surprise of many market watchers, Thailand's exchange rate peg to the dollar collapsed in July 1997, leading to similar rounds of currency devaluations in other East Asian countries. This study seeks to determine whether there were identifiable contrasts in implementation between Thailand's peg and a perennially successful peg -- Austria's peg to the Deutsche mark -- that would have hinted at problems for Thailand prior to July 1997. The comparison suggests that Thailand was not sufficiently vigilant about keeping its inflation rate low in the early 1990s. By 1995, Thailand faced a situation in which a tight monetary policy involving high domestic interest rates would not always have created disinflationary pressure, as high interest rates also tended to attract greater capital inflow to Thailand. In this environment, Thailand's monetary policy became erratic and failed to maintain the exchange rate peg.
Table of Contents
- DS1: Dataset
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- 1246 (Type: ICPSR Study Number)
Is previous version of
Dueker, Michael J., Fischer, Andreas M.. The mechanics of a successful exchange-rate peg: Lessons for emerging markets. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review.83, (5), 47-56.2001.
Update Metadata: 2015-08-05 | Issue Number: 6 | Registration Date: 2015-06-15