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metadata language: English

Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games

Version
v1
Resource Type
Dataset : survey data
Creator
  • Bo, Pedro Dal (Brown University)
Other Title
  • Version 1 (Subtitle)
Publication Date
2013-03-27
Language
English
Description
  • Abstract

    While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions. (JEL C72, C73, C91, C92)
  • Table of Contents

    Datasets:

    • DS1: Dataset
Collection Mode
  • The zipped package contains Stata, PDF, and text files, which provide data, tables, and figures used in the publication.

    These data are part of ICPSR's Publication-Related Archive and are distributed exactly as they arrived from the data depositor. ICPSR has not checked or processed this material. Users should consult the investigator(s) if further information is desired.

Availability
Download
This study is freely available to the general public via web download.
Alternative Identifiers
  • 34573 (Type: ICPSR Study Number)
Publications
  • Bo, Pedro Dal. Cooperation under the shadow of the future: Experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games. American Economic Review.95, (5), 1591-1604.2005.
    • ID: 10.1257/000282805775014434 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2015-08-05 | Issue Number: 6 | Registration Date: 2015-06-16

Bo, Pedro Dal (2013): Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games. Version 1. Version: v1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR34573.v1