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Replication data for: Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Carpenter, Jeffrey
  • Matthews, Peter Hans
  • Schirm, John
Publication Date
2010-03-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Tournaments can elicit more effort but sabotage may attenuate the effect of competition. Because it is hard to separate effort and ability, the evidence on tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on sabotage because these acts often consist of subjective peer evaluation or "office politics." We discuss real effort experiments in which quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments and find that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors subvert each other more in tournaments, and as a result, workers produce less because they expect to be sabotaged. (D82, M54)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.1.504 (Text)
Publications
  • Carpenter, Jeffrey, Peter Hans Matthews, and John Schirm. “Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment.” American Economic Review 100, no. 1 (March 2010): 504–17. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.1.504.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.100.1.504 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Carpenter, Jeffrey; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John (2010): Replication data for: Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112333V1