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Replication data for: A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Asker, John
Publication Date
2010-06-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.724 (Text)
Publications
  • Asker, John. “A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel.” American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June 2010): 724–62. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.724.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.100.3.724 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Asker, John (2010): Replication data for: A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112356V1