Replication data for: A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel
- Asker, John
AbstractThis paper examines bidding in over 1,700 knockout auctions used by a bidding cartel (or ring) of stamp dealers in the 1990s. The knockout was conducted using a variant of the model studied by Daniel Graham, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1990). Following a reduced form examination of these data, damages, induced inefficiency, and the ring's benefit from colluding are estimated using a structural model in the spirit of Emmanuel Guerre, Isabelle Perrigne, and Quang Vuong (2000). A notable finding is that nonring bidders suffered damages that were of the same order of magnitude as those of the sellers. (JEL D43, D44, L12)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.3.724 (Text)
Asker, John. “A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel.” American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June 2010): 724–62. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.724.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.100.3.724 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11