My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Cabrales, Antonio
  • Miniaci, Raffaele
  • Piovesan, Marco
  • Ponti, Giovanni
Publication Date
2010-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper reports a three-phase experiment on a stylized labor market. In the first two phases, agents face simple games, which we use to estimate subjects' social and reciprocity concerns. In the last phase, four principals compete by offering agents a contract from a fixed menu. Then, agents "choose to work" for a principal by selecting one of the available contracts. We find that (i) (heterogeneous) social preferences are significant determinants of choices, (ii) for both principals and agents, strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant of choices than fairness, and (iii) agents display a marked propensity to work for principals with similar distributional concerns. (JEL D82, D86, J41)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261 (Text)
Publications
  • Cabrales, Antonio, Raffaele Miniaci, Marco Piovesan, and Giovanni Ponti. “Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts.” American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2261–78. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2261.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2261 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Cabrales, Antonio; Miniaci, Raffaele; Piovesan, Marco; Ponti, Giovanni (2010): Replication data for: Social Preferences and Strategic Uncertainty: An Experiment on Markets and Contracts. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112387V1