My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Weizsäcker, Georg
Publication Date
2010-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    The paper presents a meta dataset covering 13 experiments on social learning games. It is found that in situations where it is empirically optimal to follow others and contradict one's own information, the players err in the majority of cases, forgoing substantial parts of earnings. The average player contradicts her own signal only if the empirical odds ratio of the own signal being wrong, conditional on all available information, is larger than 2:1, rather than 1:1 as would be implied by rational expectations. A regression analysis formulates a straightforward test of rational expectations which strongly rejects the null. (JEL D82, D83, D84)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2340 (Text)
Publications
  • Weizsäcker, Georg. “Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations.” American Economic Review 100, no. 5 (December 2010): 2340–60. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.5.2340.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.100.5.2340 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Weizsäcker, Georg (2010): Replication data for: Do We Follow Others When We Should? A Simple Test of Rational Expectations. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112388