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Replication data for: The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Dal Bó, Pedro
  • Fréchette, Guillaume R.
Publication Date
2011-02-01
Description
  • Abstract

    A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.1.411 (Text)
Publications
  • Dal Bó, Pedro, and Guillaume R Fréchette. “The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence.” American Economic Review 101, no. 1 (February 2011): 411–29. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.411.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.101.1.411 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Dal Bó, Pedro; Fréchette, Guillaume R. (2011): Replication data for: The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112401