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metadata language: English

Replication data for: Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Hart, Oliver
  • Zehnder, Christian
Publication Date
2011-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts—which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions—cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.493 (Text)
Publications
  • Fehr, Ernst, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder. “Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence.” American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 2011): 493–525. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.493.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.101.2.493 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian (2011): Replication data for: Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112406