My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Dulleck, Uwe
  • Kerschbamer, Rudolf
  • Sutter, Matthias
Publication Date
2011-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Credence goods markets are characterized by asymmetric information between sellers and consumers that may give rise to inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market breakdown. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that liability or verifiability yield efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability at best a minor, effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to higher efficiency as long as liability is violated. (JEL D12, D82)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.526 (Text)
Publications
  • Dulleck, Uwe, Rudolf Kerschbamer, and Matthias Sutter. “The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition.” American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 2011): 526–55. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.526.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.101.2.526 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias (2011): Replication data for: The Economics of Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112407V1