My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Huck, Steffen
  • Seltzer, Andrew J.
  • Wallace, Brian
Publication Date
2011-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relationship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.819 (Text)
Publications
  • Huck, Steffen, Andrew J Seltzer, and Brian Wallace. “Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear’s Model.” American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 2011): 819–43. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.819.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.101.2.819 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Huck, Steffen; Seltzer, Andrew J.; Wallace, Brian (2011): Replication data for: Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112412V1