Replication data for: Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear's Model
- Huck, Steffen
- Seltzer, Andrew J.
- Wallace, Brian
AbstractThis paper provides the first experimental test of Edward Lazear's (1979) model of deferred compensation. We examine the relationship between firms' wage offers and workers' effort supply in a multi-period environment. If firms can ex ante commit to a wage schedule with deferred compensation, workers should respond by supplying sufficient effort to avoid dismissal. We contrast this full-commitment case to controls with no commitment and computer-generated wages in order to examine the roles of monetary incentives, social preferences, and reciprocity. Finally, we examine a setup without formal commitment, but where firms can build a reputation for paying deferred wages. (JEL D86, J22, J31, J33, J41)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.819 (Text)
Huck, Steffen, Andrew J Seltzer, and Brian Wallace. “Deferred Compensation in Multiperiod Labor Contracts: An Experimental Test of Lazear’s Model.” American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 2011): 819–43. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.819.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.101.2.819 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11