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Replication data for: Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Levitt, Steven D.
  • List, John A.
  • Sadoff, Sally E.
Publication Date
2011-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games—Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games. (JEL C73)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.2.975 (Text)
Publications
  • Levitt, Steven D, John A List, and Sally E Sadoff. “Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players.” American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 2011): 975–90. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.975.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.101.2.975 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Levitt, Steven D.; List, John A.; Sadoff, Sally E. (2011): Replication data for: Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112418V1