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Replication data for: The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Chen, Roy
  • Chen, Yan
Publication Date
2011-10-01
Description
  • Abstract

    When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments. (JEL C71, C91, D71)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2562 (Text)
Publications
  • Chen, Roy, and Yan Chen. “The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection.” American Economic Review 101, no. 6 (October 2011): 2562–89. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2562.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.101.6.2562 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Chen, Roy; Chen, Yan (2011): Replication data for: The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112462