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Replication data for: Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Fudenberg, Drew
  • Rand, David G.
  • Dreber, Anna
Publication Date
2012-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We study the experimental play of the repeated prisoner's dilemma when intended actions are implemented with noise. In treatments where cooperation is an equilibrium, subjects cooperate substantially more than in treatments without cooperative equilibria. In all settings there was considerable strategic diversity, indicating that subjects had not fully learned the distribution of play. Furthermore, cooperative strategies yielded higher payoffs than uncooperative strategies in the treatments with cooperative equilibria. In these treatments successful strategies were "lenient" in not retaliating for the first defection, and many were "forgiving" in trying to return to cooperation after inflicting a punishment. (JEL C72, C73, D81)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720 (Text)
Publications
  • Fudenberg, Drew, David G. Rand, and Anna Dreber. American Economic Review, American Economic Review, 102, no. 2 (n.d.): 720–49. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.2.720.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.102.2.720 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G.; Dreber, Anna (2012): Replication data for: Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112512V1