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Replication data for: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Budish, Eric
  • Cantillon, Estelle
Publication Date
2012-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. (JEL D63, D82, I23)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.5.2237 (Text)
Publications
  • Budish, Eric, and Estelle Cantillon. “The Multi-Unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard.” American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (August 2012): 2237–71. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.5.2237.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.102.5.2237 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Budish, Eric; Cantillon, Estelle (2012): Replication data for: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112547