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Replication data for: The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Charness, Gary
  • Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
  • Jiménez, Natalia
  • Lacomba, Juan A.
  • Lagos, Francisco
Publication Date
2012-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility. (JEL J31, J33, J41)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.5.2358 (Text)
Publications
  • Charness, Gary, Ramón Cobo-Reyes, Natalia Jiménez, Juan A Lacomba, and Francisco Lagos. “The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game.” American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (August 2012): 2358–79. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.5.2358.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.102.5.2358 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-11

Charness, Gary; Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia; Lacomba, Juan A.; Lagos, Francisco (2012): Replication data for: The Hidden Advantage of Delegation: Pareto Improvements in a Gift Exchange Game. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112550