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Replication data for: Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Ambrus, Attila
  • Greiner, Ben
Publication Date
2012-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing. (JEL C92, H41, K42)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3317 (Text)
Publications
  • Ambrus, Attila, and Ben Greiner. “Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review 102, no. 7 (December 2012): 3317–32. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3317.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3317 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben (2012): Replication data for: Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112568V1