Replication data for: Revolving Door Lobbyists
- Blanes i Vidal, Jordi
- Draca, Mirko
- Fons-Rosen, Christian
AbstractWashington's "revolving door"—the movement from government service into the lobbying industry—is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3731 (Text)
Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. “Revolving Door Lobbyists.” American Economic Review 102, no. 7 (December 2012): 3731–48. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3731.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3731 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12