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Replication data for: Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
- Grennan, Matthew
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Abstract
Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect. (JEL C78, L13, L14, L64)
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Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.145 (Text)
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Grennan, Matthew. “Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices.” American Economic Review 103, no. 1 (February 2013): 145–77. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.145.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.103.1.145 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12
Grennan, Matthew (2013): Replication data for: Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112586V1
