Metadata

Replication data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Duflo, Esther
  • Greenstone, Michael
  • Pande, Rohini
  • Ryan, Nicholas
Publication Date
2013-05-01
Description

  • Abstract

    We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator.
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.314 (Text)
Publications
  • Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, and Nicholas Ryan. “What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors.” American Economic Review 103, no. 3 (May 2013): 314–19. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.3.314.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.103.3.314 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12