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Replication data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors
- Duflo, Esther
- Greenstone, Michael
- Pande, Rohini
- Ryan, Nicholas
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Abstract
We study differences in quality in the market for third-party environmental auditors in Gujarat, India. We find that, despite the low overall quality, auditors are heterogeneous and some perform well. We posit that these high-quality auditors survive by using their good name to insulate select client plants from regulatory scrutiny. We find two pieces of evidence broadly consistent with this hypothesis: (i) though estimates are not precise, higher-quality auditors appear to be paid more both in their work as third-party auditors and in their complementary work as consultants; and (ii) plants with high-quality auditors incur fewer costly penalties from the regulator.
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Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.3.314 (Text)
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Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, and Nicholas Ryan. “What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors.” American Economic Review 103, no. 3 (May 2013): 314–19. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.3.314.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.103.3.314 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12
Duflo, Esther; Greenstone, Michael; Pande, Rohini; Ryan, Nicholas (2013): Replication data for: What Does Reputation Buy? Differentiation in a Market for Third-Party Auditors. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112625V1
