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Replication data for: The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Fehr, Ernst
  • Herz, Holger
  • Wilkening, Tom
Publication Date
2013-06-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Authority and power permeate political, social, and economic life, but empirical knowledge about the motivational origins and consequences of authority is limited. We study the motivation and incentive effects of authority experimentally in an authority-delegation game. Individuals often retain authority even when its delegation is in their material interest—suggesting that authority has nonpecuniary consequences for utility. Authority also leads to overprovision of effort by the controlling parties, while a large percentage of subordinates underprovide effort despite pecuniary incentives to the contrary. Authority thus has important motivational consequences that exacerbate the inefficiencies arising from suboptimal delegation choices.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.4.1325 (Text)
Publications
  • Fehr, Ernst, Holger Herz, and Tom Wilkening. “The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power.” American Economic Review 103, no. 4 (June 2013): 1325–59. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.4.1325.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.103.4.1325 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Fehr, Ernst; Herz, Holger; Wilkening, Tom (2013): Replication data for: The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112646