My da|ra Login

Detailed view

metadata language: English

Replication data for: When Should Sellers Use Auctions?

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Roberts, James W.
  • Sweeting, Andrew
Publication Date
2013-08-01
Description
  • Abstract

    A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS timber auctions where our estimates predict that the sequential mechanism would increase revenue and efficiency.
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.5.1830 (Text)
Publications
  • Roberts, James W, and Andrew Sweeting. “When Should Sellers Use Auctions?” American Economic Review 103, no. 5 (August 2013): 1830–61. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.5.1830.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.103.5.1830 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Roberts, James W.; Sweeting, Andrew (2013): Replication data for: When Should Sellers Use Auctions?. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112659V1