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Replication data for: Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Kovrijnykh, Natalia
Publication Date
2013-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    This paper analyzes a dynamic lending relationship where the borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, and the lender offers long-term contracts that are imperfectly enforced and repeatedly renegotiated. No commitment and full commitment by the lender are special cases of this model where the probability of enforcement equals zero and one, respectively. I show that an increase in the degree of enforcement can lower social welfare. Furthermore, properties of equilibrium investment dynamics with partial commitment drastically differ from those with full and no commitment. In particular, investment is positively related to cash flow, consistent with empirical findings.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.7.2848 (Text)
Publications
  • Kovrijnykh, Natalia. “Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment.” American Economic Review 103, no. 7 (December 2013): 2848–74. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.7.2848.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.103.7.2848 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Kovrijnykh, Natalia (2013): Replication data for: Debt Contracts with Partial Commitment. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112683