Replication data for: On the Selection of Arbitrators
- de Clippel, Geoffroy
- Eliaz, Kfir
- Knight, Brian
AbstractA key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank, a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short-listing procedure.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3434 (Text)
Clippel, Geoffroy de, Kfir Eliaz, and Brian Knight. “On the Selection of Arbitrators.” American Economic Review 104, no. 11 (November 2014): 3434–58. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.11.3434.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3434 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12