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Replication data for: Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians
- Ho, Kate
- Pakes, Ariel
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Abstract
We estimate an insurer-specific preference function which rationalizes hospital referrals for privately insured births in California. The function is additively separable in: a hospital price paid by the insurer, the distance traveled, and plan- and severity-specific hospital fixed effects (capturing hospital quality). We use an inequality estimator that allows for errors in price and detailed hospital-severity interactions and obtain markedly different results than those from a logit. The estimates indicate that insurers with more capitated physicians are more responsive to price. Capitated plans send patients further to utilize similar quality, lower-priced hospitals; but the cost-quality trade-off does not vary with capitation rates. (JEL G22, H51, I11, I13, I18, J44)
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Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3841 (Text)
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Ho, Kate, and Ariel Pakes. “Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians.” American Economic Review 104, no. 12 (December 2014): 3841–84. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3841.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.104.12.3841 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12
Ho, Kate; Pakes, Ariel (2014): Replication data for: Hospital Choices, Hospital Prices, and Financial Incentives to Physicians. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112712
