Replication data for: Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks
- Ambrus, Attila
- Mobius, Markus
- Szeidl, Adam
AbstractWe develop a model in which connections between individuals serve as social collateral to enforce informal insurance payments. We show that: (i) The degree of insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured with the per capita number of connections that groups have with the rest of the community. "Two-dimensional" networks—like real-world networks in Peruvian villages—are sufficiently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. (ii) In second- best arrangements, insurance is local: agents fully share shocks within, but imperfectly between endogenously emerging risk-sharing groups. We also discuss how endogenous social collateral affects our results.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.149 (Text)
Ambrus, Attila, Markus Mobius, and Adam Szeidl. “Consumption Risk-Sharing in Social Networks.” American Economic Review 104, no. 1 (January 2014): 149–82. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.1.149.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.104.1.149 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12