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Replication data for: Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Nordhaus, William
Publication Date
2015-04-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Notwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.15000001 (Text)
Publications
  • Nordhaus, William. “Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy.” American Economic Review 105, no. 4 (April 2015): 1339–70. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.15000001 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Nordhaus, William (2015): Replication data for: Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112858V1