Replication data for: Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy
- Nordhaus, William
AbstractNotwithstanding great progress in scientific and economic understanding of climate change, it has proven difficult to forge international agreements because of free-riding, as seen in the defunct Kyoto Protocol. This study examines the club as a model for international climate policy. Based on economic theory and empirical modeling, it finds that without sanctions against non-participants there are no stable coalitions other than those with minimal abatement. By contrast, a regime with small trade penalties on non-participants, a Climate Club, can induce a large stable coalition with high levels of abatement. (JEL Q54, Q58, K32, K33)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.15000001 (Text)
Nordhaus, William. “Climate Clubs: Overcoming Free-Riding in International Climate Policy.” American Economic Review 105, no. 4 (April 2015): 1339–70. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.15000001 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12