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Replication data for: Efficient Bailouts?

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Bianchi, Javier
Publication Date
2016-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20121524 (Text)
Publications
  • Bianchi, Javier. “Efficient Bailouts?” American Economic Review 106, no. 12 (December 2016): 3607–59. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20121524.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20121524 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Bianchi, Javier (2016): Replication data for: Efficient Bailouts?. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112896