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Replication data for: Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Gowrisankaran, Gautam
  • Nevo, Aviv
  • Town, Robert
Publication Date
2015-01-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We estimate a bargaining model of competition between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs) and use the estimates to evaluate the effects of hospital mergers. We find that MCO bargaining restrains hospital prices significantly. The model demonstrates the potential impact of coinsurance rates, which allow MCOs to partly steer patients toward cheaper hospitals. We show that increasing patient coinsurance tenfold would reduce prices by 16 percent. We find that a proposed hospital acquisition in Northern Virginia that was challenged by the Federal Trade Commission would have significantly raised hospital prices. Remedies based on separate bargaining do not alleviate the price increases. (JEL C78, G34, I11, I13, L13)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130223 (Text)
Publications
  • Gowrisankaran, Gautam, Aviv Nevo, and Robert Town. “Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry.” American Economic Review 105, no. 1 (January 2015): 172–203. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130223.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20130223 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Gowrisankaran, Gautam; Nevo, Aviv; Town, Robert (2015): Replication data for: Mergers When Prices Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112908