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Replication data for: Clientelism in Indian Villages

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Anderson, Siwan
  • Francois, Patrick
  • Kotwal, Ashok
Publication Date
2015-06-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130623 (Text)
Publications
  • Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. “Clientelism in Indian Villages.” American Economic Review 105, no. 6 (June 2015): 1780–1816. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130623.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20130623 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Anderson, Siwan; Francois, Patrick; Kotwal, Ashok (2015): Replication data for: Clientelism in Indian Villages. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112922