Replication data for: Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
- Breitmoser, Yves
AbstractIn the repeated prisoner's dilemma, predictions are notoriously difficult. Recently, however, Blonski, Ockenfels, and Spagnolo (2011)—henceforth, BOS‐showed that experimental subjects predictably cooperate when the discount factor exceeds a particular threshold. I analyze individual strategies in four recent experiments to examine whether strategies are predictable, too. Behavior is well summarized by "Semi-Grim" strategies: cooperate after mutual cooperation, defect after mutual defection, randomize otherwise. This holds both in aggregate and individually, and it explains the BOS-threshold: Semi-Grim equilibria appear as the discount factor crosses this threshold, and then, subjects start cooperating in round 1 and switch to Semi-Grim in continuation play. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D12)
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130675 (Text)
Breitmoser, Yves. “Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma.” American Economic Review 105, no. 9 (September 2015): 2882–2910. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130675.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.20130675 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12