Replication data for: Announcements of Support and Public Good Provision
- Kessler, Judd B.
AbstractProviding information about contributions to public goods is known to generate further contributions. However, it is often impossible to provide verifiable information on contributions. Through a large-scale field experiment and a series of laboratory experiments, I show that nonbinding announcements of support for a public good encourage others to contribute, even when actual contributions might not or cannot be made. Providing a way to easily announce support for a charity increases donations by $865 per workplace fundraising campaign (or 16 percent of average giving). I discuss implications for understanding prosocial behavior and for organizations aiming to increase contributions to public goods.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130711 (Text)
Kessler, Judd B. “Announcements of Support and Public Good Provision.” American Economic Review 107, no. 12 (December 2017): 3760–87. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130711.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.20130711 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12