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Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Bobonis, Gustavo J.
  • Cámara Fuertes, Luis R.
  • Schwabe, Rainer
Publication Date
2016-08-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Does monitoring corrupt activities induce a sustained reduction in corruption? Using longitudinal data on audits of municipal governments in Puerto Rico, we show corruption is considerably lower in municipalities with timely audits—before elections. However, these municipalities do not exhibit decreased levels of corruption in subsequent audits, even while mayors in these benefit from higher reelection rates. Our results suggest that audits enable voters to select responsive but corruptible politicians to office. Audit programs must disseminate results when they are most relevant for voters—shortly before an election—and ensure that these programs are sustained, long-term commitments.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130874 (Text)
Publications
  • Bobonis, Gustavo J., Luis R. Cámara Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe. “Monitoring Corruptible Politicians.” American Economic Review 106, no. 8 (August 2016): 2371–2405. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130874.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20130874 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Bobonis, Gustavo J.; Cámara Fuertes, Luis R.; Schwabe, Rainer (2016): Replication data for: Monitoring Corruptible Politicians. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112932