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Replication data for: A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt
- Chatterjee, Satyajit
- Eyigungor, Burcu
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Abstract
A sovereign's inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate this problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in debt contracts. In the event of default, creditors are to be paid off in the order in which they lent (the "absolute priority" or "first-in-time" rule). In this paper, we propose a modification of the absolute priority rule suited to sovereign debts contracts and analyze its positive and normative implications within a quantitatively realistic model of sovereign debt and default. (JEL E32, E44, F34, G15, H63, O16, O19)
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Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130932 (Text)
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Chatterjee, Satyajit, and Burcu Eyigungor. “A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt.” American Economic Review 105, no. 12 (December 2015): 3740–65. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130932.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.20130932 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12
Chatterjee, Satyajit; Eyigungor, Burcu (2015): Replication data for: A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112934
