Metadata

Replication data for: A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Chatterjee, Satyajit
  • Eyigungor, Burcu
Publication Date
2015-12-01
Description

  • Abstract

    A sovereign's inability to commit to a course of action regarding future borrowing and default behavior makes long-term debt costly (the problem of debt dilution). One mechanism to mitigate this problem is the inclusion of a seniority clause in debt contracts. In the event of default, creditors are to be paid off in the order in which they lent (the "absolute priority" or "first-in-time" rule). In this paper, we propose a modification of the absolute priority rule suited to sovereign debts contracts and analyze its positive and normative implications within a quantitatively realistic model of sovereign debt and default. (JEL E32, E44, F34, G15, H63, O16, O19)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130932 (Text)
Publications
  • Chatterjee, Satyajit, and Burcu Eyigungor. “A Seniority Arrangement for Sovereign Debt.” American Economic Review 105, no. 12 (December 2015): 3740–65. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130932.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20130932 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12