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metadata language: English

Replication data for: You Owe Me

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Malmendier, Ulrike
  • Schmidt, Klaus M.
Publication Date
2017-02-01
Description
  • Abstract

    In business and politics, gifts are often aimed at influencing the recipient at the expense of third parties. In an experimental study, which removes informational and incentive confounds, subjects strongly respond to small gifts even though they understand the gift giver's intention. Our findings question existing models of social preferences. They point to anthropological and sociological theories about gifts creating an obligation to reciprocate. We capture these effects in a simple extension of existing models. We show that common policy responses (disclosure, size limits) may be ineffective, consistent with our model. Financial incentives are effective but can backfire.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20140890 (Text)
Publications
  • Malmendier, Ulrike, and Klaus M. Schmidt. “You Owe Me.” American Economic Review 107, no. 2 (February 2017): 493–526. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140890.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20140890 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Malmendier, Ulrike; Schmidt, Klaus M. (2017): Replication data for: You Owe Me. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E112996V1