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Replication data for: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Levin, Jonathan
  • Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Publication Date
2016-09-01
Description
  • Abstract

    The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.
Availability
Download
Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141212 (Text)
Publications
  • Levin, Jonathan, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction.” American Economic Review 106, no. 9 (September 2016): 2528–51. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141212.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20141212 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Levin, Jonathan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej (2016): Replication data for: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113004V1