Replication data for: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
- Levin, Jonathan
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej
AbstractThe combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-behaved linear demand curves, and suggest some practical difficulties with dynamic implementations of the Vickrey auction.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141212 (Text)
Levin, Jonathan, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. “Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction.” American Economic Review 106, no. 9 (September 2016): 2528–51. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141212.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.20141212 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12