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Replication data for: Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Crawford, Gregory S.
  • Pavanini, Nicola
  • Schivardi, Fabiano
Publication Date
2018-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We study the effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the market for small business lines of credit. We estimate a structural model of credit demand, loan use, pricing, and firm default using matched firm-bank data from Italy. We find evidence of adverse selection in the form of a positive correlation between the unobserved determinants of demand for credit and default. Our counterfactual experiments show that while increases in adverse selection increase prices and defaults on average, reducing credit supply, banks' market power can mitigate these negative effects.
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150487 (Text)
Publications
  • Crawford, Gregory S., Nicola Pavanini, and Fabiano Schivardi. “Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets.” American Economic Review 108, no. 7 (July 2018): 1659–1701. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150487.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.20150487 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Crawford, Gregory S.; Pavanini, Nicola; Schivardi, Fabiano (2018): Replication data for: Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113054