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Replication data for: Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile

Resource Type
  • Baland, Jean-Marie
  • Robinson, James A.
Publication Date
  • Abstract

    Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing them to control their workers' political behavior, such as their votes in the absence of secret ballot. We examine the effects of the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile in 1958 on voting behavior. Before the reforms, localities with more pervasive patron-client relationships tended to exhibit a much stronger support for the right-wing parties, traditionally associated with the landed oligarchy. After the reform, however, this difference across localities completely disappeared. (JEL D72, N46, O13, O15, O17)
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.5.1737 (Text)
  • Baland, Jean-Marie, and James A Robinson. “Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile.” American Economic Review 98, no. 5 (November 2008): 1737–65.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.98.5.1737 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Baland, Jean-Marie; Robinson, James A. (2008): Replication data for: Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset.