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metadata language: English

Replication data for: Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Miller, Nathan H.
Publication Date
2009-06-01
Description
  • Abstract

    The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning gametheoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime. (JEL D43, L12, L13, K21)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.3.750 (Text)
Publications
  • Miller, Nathan H. “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement.” American Economic Review 99, no. 3 (May 2009): 750–68. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.3.750.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.99.3.750 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Miller, Nathan H. (2009): Replication data for: Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113304V1