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Replication data for: The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Besley, Timothy
  • Persson, Torsten
Publication Date
2009-09-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices" in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory. (JEL D72, E62, H11, H20, P14)
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 (Text)
Publications
  • Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics.” American Economic Review 99, no. 4 (August 2009): 1218–44. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1218.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1218 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Besley, Timothy; Persson, Torsten (2009): Replication data for: The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113314