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Replication data for: Direct Democracy and Public Employees

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Matsusaka, John G.
Publication Date
2009-12-01
Description
  • Abstract

    In the public sector, employment may be inefficiently high because of patronage, and wages may be inefficiently high because of public employee interest groups. This paper explores whether the initiative process, a direct democracy institution of growing importance, ameliorates these political economy problems. In a sample of 650+ cities, I find that when public employees cannot bargain collectively and patronage could be a problem, initiatives appear to cut employment but not wages. When public employees bargain collectively, driving up wages, the initiative appears to cut wages but not employment. The employment-cutting result is robust; the wage-cutting result survives some but not all robustness tests. (JEL D72, J31, J45, J52)
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2227 (Text)
Publications
  • Matsusaka, John G. “Direct Democracy and Public Employees.” American Economic Review 99, no. 5 (December 2009): 2227–46. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.2227.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.99.5.2227 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Matsusaka, John G. (2009): Replication data for: Direct Democracy and Public Employees. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113350