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Replication data for: Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Noussair, Charles N.
  • van Soest, Daan
  • Stoop, Jan
Publication Date
2015-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20151018 (Text)
Publications
  • Noussair, Charles N., Daan van Soest, and Jan Stoop. “Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment.” American Economic Review 105, no. 5 (May 2015): 408–13. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151018.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.p20151018 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Noussair, Charles N.; van Soest, Daan; Stoop, Jan (2015): Replication data for: Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113364V1