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Replication data for: Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Heyes, Anthony
  • List, John A.
Publication Date
2016-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    In strategic settings a player may be able to influence the behavior of an opponent by revealing information about their own characteristics. They may for example aim to exploit stereotypes held by others. We provide an experimental test of this. A substantial fraction of players in a trust game exhibit a positive willingness to pay to reveal a photograph of themselves to their randomly-assigned partner. This suggests that they perceive that they can use their own characteristics to influence the behavior of others. The demand for such self-revelation depends negatively on price.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20161011 (Text)
Publications
  • Heyes, Anthony, and John A. List. American Economic Review, American Economic Review, 106, no. 5 (n.d.): 319–23. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161011.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.p20161011 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Heyes, Anthony; List, John A. (2016): Replication data for: Supply and Demand for Discrimination: Strategic Revelation of Own Characteristics in a Trust Game. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113435