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Replication data for: Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching

Version
1
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Rees-Jones, Alex
Publication Date
2017-05-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Recent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171028 (Text)
Publications
  • Rees-Jones, Alex. American Economic Review, American Economic Review, 107, no. 5 (n.d.): 225–29. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171028.
    • ID: 10.1257/aer.p20171028 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Rees-Jones, Alex (2017): Replication data for: Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching. Version: 1. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113503V1