Replication data for: Mistaken Play in the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm: Implications for Positive Assortative Matching
- Rees-Jones, Alex
AbstractRecent literature has documented failures of truthful preference reporting in the strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm. I consider the implications of these strategic mistakes for a common welfare consideration: the ability of the mechanism to sort the best students to the best schools. I find that these mistakes have the potential to significantly help or significantly hinder sorting. Through this channel, the presence of mistaken play may have widely varying welfare effects. I discuss related considerations in the welfare evaluation of mistaken play in the deferred acceptance algorithm and the implications for "nudges" that correct these mistakes.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171028 (Text)
Rees-Jones, Alex. American Economic Review, American Economic Review, 107, no. 5 (n.d.): 225–29. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171028.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.p20171028 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12