Replication data for: Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago's Exam Schools
- Abdulkadroǧlu, Atila
- Angrist, Joshua D.
- Narita, Yusuke
- Pathak, Parag A.
- Zarate, Roman A.
AbstractMany school and college admission systems use centralized mechanisms to allocate seats based on applicant preferences and school priorities. When tie-breaking uses non-randomly assigned criteria like distance or a test score, applicants with the same preferences and priorities are not directly comparable. The non-lottery setting does generate a kind of local random assignment that opens the door to regression discontinuity designs. This paper introduces a hybrid RD/propensity score empirical strategy that exploits quasi-experiments embedded in serial dictatorship, a mechanism widely used for college and selective K-12 school admissions. We use our approach to estimate achievement effects of Chicago's exam schools.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171111 (Text)
AbdulkadIroglu, Atila, Joshua D. Angrist, Yusuke Narita, Parag A. Pathak, and Roman A. Zarate. “Regression Discontinuity in Serial Dictatorship: Achievement Effects at Chicago’s Exam Schools.” American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (May 2017): 240–45. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171111.
- ID: 10.1257/aer.p20171111 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12