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Replication data for: Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India
- Cole, Shawn
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Abstract
This paper integrates theories of political budget cycles with theories of tactical electoral redistribution to test for political capture in a novel way. Studying banks in India, I find that government-owned bank lending tracks the electoral cycle, with agricultural credit increasing by 5-10 percentage points in an election year. There is significant cross-sectional targeting, with large increases in districts in which the election is particularly close. This targeting does not occur in nonelection years or in private bank lending. I show capture is costly: elections affect loan repayment, and election-year credit booms do not measurably affect agricultural output. (JEL D72, O13, O17, Q14, Q18)
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Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/app.1.1.219 (Text)
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Cole, Shawn. “Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1, no. 1 (January 2009): 219–50. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.1.1.219.
- ID: 10.1257/app.1.1.219 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12
Cole, Shawn (2009): Replication data for: Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113551
