Replication data for: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime
- Do, Quoc-Anh
- Nguyen, Kieu-Trang
- Tran, Anh N.
AbstractWe study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.
Is supplement to
DOI: 10.1257/app.20130472 (Text)
Do, Quoc-Anh, Kieu-Trang Nguyen, and Anh N. Tran. “One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9, no. 4 (October 2017): 1–29. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20130472.
- ID: 10.1257/app.20130472 (DOI)
Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12