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Replication data for: Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Polyakova, Maria
Publication Date
2016-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    I take advantage of regulatory and pricing dynamics in Medicare Part D to explore interactions among adverse selection, inertia, and regulation. I first document novel evidence of adverse selection and switching frictions within Part D using detailed administrative data. I then estimate a contract choice and pricing model that quantifies the importance of inertia for risk sorting. I find that in Part D switching costs help sustain an adversely-selected equilibrium. I also estimate that active ?decision making in the existing policy environment could lead to a substantial gain in annual consumer surplus of on average $400-$600 per capita--20 percent to 30 percent of average annual spending.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20150004 (Text)
Publications
  • Polyakova, Maria. “Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 3 (July 2016): 165–95. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150004.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.20150004 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Polyakova, Maria (2016): Replication data for: Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113628