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Replication data for: Do Fiscal Rules Matter?

Version
V0
Resource Type
Dataset
Creator
  • Grembi, Veronica
  • Nannicini, Tommaso
  • Troiano, Ugo
Publication Date
2016-07-01
Description
  • Abstract

    Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.
Availability
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Relations
  • Is supplement to
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20150076 (Text)
Publications
  • Grembi, Veronica, Tommaso Nannicini, and Ugo Troiano. “Do Fiscal Rules Matter?” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 3 (July 2016): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20150076.
    • ID: 10.1257/app.20150076 (DOI)

Update Metadata: 2020-05-18 | Issue Number: 2 | Registration Date: 2019-10-12

Grembi, Veronica; Nannicini, Tommaso; Troiano, Ugo (2016): Replication data for: Do Fiscal Rules Matter?. Version: V0. ICPSR - Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113637